Does the Florida Supreme Court’s Abortion Amendment Ruling Make Florida Democrats More Competitive?

Paul Rader
13 min readApr 11, 2024
Source: Max Greenwood. Miami Herald. July 26, 2023. “‘All hands on deck’: Florida Democrats to drop $1 million on voter registration push.” https://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article277652833.html (accessed April 10, 2024).

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On April 1, 2024, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the state’s limit on most abortions to 15 weeks after pregnancy. But it also narrowly allowed a proposed amendment to move forward to the November 2024 ballot that seeks to enshrine abortion access into the state constitution. The ruling has led to pundits predicting, or at least speculating, that the issue may give Democrats a huge boost in Florida, potentially even handing the state to Joe Biden in this year’s presidential election.

But will the issue really make Democrats immediately (more) competitive in a state that has seemed to trend progressively more Republican and conservative? Could the abortion ruling, and the abortion amendment on the state’s ballot, be the catalyst for a turnaround for Democrats? It might, but don’t be too sure. It might make them more competitive, but there are still major obstacles in the way to both pass the ballot measure and to win the state for Biden in 2024.

Today we look at what the abortion ballot measure that Florida voters (including myself) will be voting on entails and the arguments surrounding it, comparisons to Ohio’s own state ballot measure on abortion that passed, Democrats’ recent history in Florida elections, and the uphill battle that the Florida Democratic Party (FDP) faces in being competitive in the state.

(As always with my writing, this is a nonpartisan look at the situation, but I think that fact particularly bears noting considering how contentious the issue of abortion is. This post does not make a statement on whether the ballot measure is “good” or “bad” or even “a mix of good and bad.”)

What Does the Abortion Ballot Measure Say?

The ballot title, which is what the measure will be labeled as on the ballot, calls it “Amendment to Limit Government Interference with Abortion.” The ballot measure itself is rather short, stating the following:

Limiting government interference with abortion. — Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.

The ballot summary mostly says the same thing but also notes that “This amendment does not change the Legislature’s constitutional authority to require notification to a parent or guardian before a minor has an abortion.” The ballot summary — which is what Florida voters will actually read on their ballot, along with the title — is, well, a summary of the text. A lot of times, the ballot text of measures is too long to include on a ballot, but in this case, the text and summary are mostly the same.

That’s what the ballot measure itself says. But what do political movers and shakers say about the measure? Fortunately, Ballotpedia gives us a lot of great info surrounding this ballot measure (as they do about ballot measures across the country). Here’s a summary of the main proponents and opponents and what they have to say. Their credibility is up to you to decide.

Proponents of the Measure

The sponsor of the ballot measure is Floridians Protecting Freedom. Some of the most prominent elected officials also supporting the measure are U.S. Representative Federica Wilson and two big-name state senators from South Florida, Lauren Book and Jason Pizzo. Groups that are assisting the measure include the ACLU of Florida, the League of Women Voters of Florida, and Planned Parenthood of Southwest and Central Florida.

Among their main arguments are the following:

Opponents of the Measure

The most prominent figures leading the charge against the ballot measure are Florida’s Governor Ron DeSantis and Attorney General Ashley Moody. Moody was unsuccessful in keeping the measure from getting to the ballot, and DeSantis projects that voters will choose “no” on the measure. Groups that are opposing the measure include the Republican Party of Florida (RPOF), the National Center for Life and Liberty, and Susan B. Anthony Pro-Life America.

Among their main arguments are the following:

  • Moody, in particular, calls the amendment misleading and deceptive and says that Floridians Protecting Freedom has been ambiguous on their definition of “viability” of a fetus.
  • Florida Voice for the Unborn says that the amendment allows for unlimited abortion, including partial-birth abortions, overrides parental consent, and prohibits “reasonable” protections for women’s health.
  • The RPOF says that the amendment “…would bypass the delegated authority of the Legislature and override the right to life laws in effect in the State of Florida.”

Comparisons and Contrasts to the Ohio Abortion Ballot Measure

Comparisons

Several comparisons to the abortion ballot measure that passed in Ohio in 2023, which I wrote about it here, can be made. The Ohio abortion measure also faced some major roadblocks, including three lawsuits that ultimately were unsuccessful in stopping it from reaching the ballot for voters to decide on. While the legal wrangling maybe wasn’t quite that extensive in Florida, one can see the similarities between the two measures’ court battles — namely Moody’s argument that Florida’s measure was deceptive and misleading, an argument which the Ohioans United for Reproductive Rights, et al. v. Ohio Ballot Board, et al. case centered on for Ohio’s measure.

There is also the fact that Florida, like Ohio, has a recent history of being handily Republican for many of the elected offices it votes on, such as governor and state legislature. While Ohio does not track its voters by party affiliation like Florida does, Ohio’s electorate probably would have a Republican plurality as well if it did account for the voters’ parties (I talk more on Florida’s electorate later in this article).

Both the Ohio and Florida Supreme Courts are also majority Republican — Florida more so. Ohio’s state supreme court justices are selected in partisan elections by voters, while Florida’s are appointed by the governor. The Ohio Supreme Court has a 4–3 Republican majority, while the Florida Supreme Court’s seven justices were all appointed by Republican governors — five of them by DeSantis. Despite these Republican court leanings, both of them allowed their respective states’ abortion measures to go onto the ballot.

Contrasts

But one of the key differences between Ohio’s measure and Florida’s is the voter threshold that the two states require for a citizen-initiated ballot measure to pass. Ohio just needs a simple majority of voters to pass (50% + 1). Florida has a much higher bar to clear — 60% of voters must vote “yes” to pass the measure. The 56.78% approval that Ohio’s measure got would not be enough to pass the Florida measure.

All else equal, it’s also naturally harder, at least usually, to get people to vote “yes” on a measure versus a “no.” Why? I remember a veteran campaign professional, one who had been involved in many ballot measure campaigns, came to one of my classes in grad school and explained the reason for it. To paraphrase, “no” votes usually just need to sow a little bit of doubt in voters’ minds, but “yes” votes typically need firm support. (Doubtful voters could just abstain from choosing yes or no entirely, but enough apprehension can be enough for them to pick “no.”

And that very fact could make the difference for Florida’s measure, in part because of the differences between how the Ohio and Florida measures are constructed. Ohio’s measure was more detailed, with several more specific stipulations. Florida’s measure is simpler, being only that one sentence that was quoted earlier:

Limiting government interference with abortion. — Except as provided in Article X, Section 22, no law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider.

Because Florida’s ballot measure is simpler, some voters may see it as too vague, making it easier for the measure’s opponents — such as DeSantis, Moody, or the RPOF — to sow doubt about the measure in voters’ mind. (Whether it is too vague is up for you to decide.)

On the other hand, voters don’t necessarily look at the full text of ballot measures. Many of them just go by the ballot title and/or ballot summary, which factors into the arguments about whether a ballot’s title or summary is misleading or deceptive for voters. Of course, the full text still matters, but the ballot title and summary make a big difference — and it might be enough to tip the scales for or against the Florida measure.

Recent Democratic Performance in Florida

Now, onto what this article was ultimately about: Does the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling on Florida’s current abortion limits, and the abortion ballot measure, make Florida Democrats more competitive? The question has been talked about here and elsewhere because the FDP has struggled mightily over the years in getting its voter base to turn out to vote. It wasn’t until November 2021 that Republican voters in Florida became more numerous than Democratic voters.

Yet with the exception of Nikki Fried (who is now the head of the FDP) winning her election for the commissioner of agriculture in 2018, a Democratic candidate has not won a statewide election in Florida since 2012, when Barack Obama won it in his presidential reelection campaign and Bill Nelson was reelected again to the U.S. Senate. A Democrat hasn’t won a gubernatorial election since “Walkin’” Lawton Chiles was reelected in 1994.

The charts below show how the candidates for two of the biggest offices on the ballot each year — the president for presidential elections, the governor for midterm elections — fared in Florida compared to the percentage of the electorate also of their party. For example, how much of the vote did a Democratic candidate get compared to how much of the electorate was registered as Democrats?

Voter registration numbers were gathered from the bookclosing reports found on the Florida Department of Elections. “Bookclosing” refers to the deadline to register to vote. In Florida, you must be registered to vote no later than 29 days before an election. And since it is a closed primary state, you can only vote in your party’s primary (if you are an NPA, or nonparty affiliate, you can only vote in primaries for nonpartisan offices). Election results were gathered from the Department of Elections’ Election Reporting System.

(The Florida Department of Elections does not show turnout rates by party affiliation, only overall turnout. So, there is no quick way to find out how many Republicans, Democrats, nonparty affiliates, etc. turned out. But for this exercise, comparing the percentage of the electorate that is one party and the percentage of the vote that party’s candidate got is a sufficient comparison point and substitute for turnout.)

The first chart shows the full numbers of voters by Democrat, Republican, and “Other” (the vast majority of which are NPAs but also includes third parties) at the time of the respective general election and the votes cast for the Democratic, Republican, and “Other” candidates in the 21st century.

The second chart compares the percentages of Republican and Democratic voters and the difference between them, and the percentages of votes for the Republican and Democratic candidates and the difference between them. Red and positive numbers indicate a Republican advantage in the category, while blue and negative numbers indicate a Democratic advantage in that category. (Positive and negative are not value judgments. They are just to demonstrate the direction the voter registration or vote share advantage went.)

The Electorate to Vote Disparity was calculated to demonstrate how much the difference was between the vote share gap and the registered voter gap. Take the 2020 presidential election, for example. The 4.29 point Electorate to Vote Disparity was calculated by doing the following:

  • Finding the difference in vote share, which was 3.36 percentage points (the Republican candidate had 51.22% of the vote, 3.36 points higher than the Democratic candidate’s 47.86%)
  • Finding the difference in voter registration, which was -0.93 percentage points (registered Democrats were 36.72% of the electorate, 0.93 points higher than the 35.79% of voters that were registered Republicans)
  • Subtracting the difference in voter registration from the difference in vote share (the 3.36 percentage point difference in vote share was 4.29 points higher than the -0.93 point difference in voter registration)

Of the Democratic presidential and gubernatorial candidates in Florida in the 21st century, the only one to win was Barack Obama both times he ran for and won the presidency in 2008 and 2012. But even then, Florida Democrats could not fully capitalize on their voter registration advantage.

  • In 2012, Democrats had a 4.49 percentage point advantage in share of the electorate, but Obama only won by 0.88 points over Mitt Romney. That led to a 3.61 point Electorate to Vote Disparity.
  • In 2008, Democrats had a 5.85 percentage point advantage in share of the electorate, but Obama only won by 2.82 points over John McCain. That led to a 3.03 point Electorate to Vote Disparity.

Florida used to be the bellwether for presidential elections: It was the only state to vote for the winning candidate in the six presidential contests from 1992 to 2016. Trump broke that streak in 2020, winning the state a second time but losing the overall election. As can be seen in the table above, Republicans were at a -0.93 percentage point disadvantage in voter registration compared to Democrats, but Trump won Florida by 3.36 points, leading to a 4.29 point Electorate to Vote Disparity.

Now, the job for Democrats in statewide elections has become that much tougher. In less than two years since the last such election, the 2022 governor’s race, the Republican advantage in voter registration has exploded. Take a look at the chart below, showing the difference in voter registration from the 2022 election to the 2024 presidential preference primary.

In about 14 months time, Republicans went from having about 300,000 more voters to about 850,000 more voters than Democrats. There are actually fewer Republicans now versus 2022. The difference is powered mostly by a precipitous drop in the total number of Democrats. Even the “Other” group saw a major decrease of their ranks.

DeSantis won his gubernatorial reelection bid in 2022 — the first statewide general election where Republicans outnumbered Democrats — in a rout of Democrat Charlie Crist (who himself used to be a Republican governor of Florida) by 19.40 percentage points. Even with support for Trump in Florida, it’s unlikely that he is going to soundly defeat Biden in the state like that in 2024 even if he does ultimately win. But Trump definitely has the advantage by winning the state twice previously and having a huge voter registration lead.

Final Thoughts: Can the Abortion Issue Tip the Scales in Democrats’ Favor?

That’s the ultimate question this article sought to answer. Does the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling on the abortion ballot measure, and the abortion laws recently passed by the Florida State Legislature, at least help Florida Democrats? It probably does. It’s a major opportunity for the FDP to capitalize on anger within their ranks (and perhaps among some pro-choice NPAs or even Republicans) over the issue. Few policy areas are as touchy and delicate as abortion.

But Florida Democrats have had plenty of opportunities to make the most of but have not done so. Although now-U.S. Senator Rick Scott was unpopular as governor, Democrats could not beat him with Charlie Crist in 2014 (though that was probably in part because Crist was previously a Republican and then an independent, so he wasn’t palatable to some Democrats). Then Scott defeated longtime U.S. Senator Bill Nelson for his seat in 2018. DeSantis won a very close race against former Tallahassee Mayor Andrew Gillum, also in 2018, when the latter’s star power was sharply rising. Republicans have consistently won the other statewide offices of attorney general, chief financial officer, and commissioner of agriculture.

And even if Democrats were to turn around their fortunes and Biden won the state from Trump in 2024, it is from a surety that the abortion ballot measure in Florida passes. A 60% approval threshold is tough to achieve, even without accounting for the Republican trends in Florida. There could be enough pro-choice sentiment amongst NPAs and Republicans, but it’s still a steep climb. And it’s not like Republicans won’t also try to capitalize on the abortion ruling themselves.

Elections are not just about the issues themselves. They’re also about how well the campaigns and candidates harness the issues with their outreach to voters. Even if they focus on the “correct” issues and take the “correct” positions, they still need to effectively reach the voters that will, or might, vote for them. The messaging may be able to win the election, but if the actual campaigning isn’t good enough, a candidate can still lose the election. There are too many factors involved in an election to say that one issue is what will be the deciding factor, even one as tense as abortion.

The abortion issue, including Florida’s abortion ballot measure, could certainly be the boon that Florida Democrats need most. But it won’t be the savior. Recent election history has shown that they have a lot more to work on than just crafting a winning message around one issue. Yet if they don’t at least capitalize on this particular opportunity, they may not stand a chance in November 2024.

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Paul Rader

Nonpartisan political analyst, researcher, and speaker; self-published author; bridging political divisions and closing gaps in civic knowledge